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NOTE
TAXATION-FEDErSAL ESTATE TAX-INCLUSION IN GROSS
ESTATE OF TRUST PROPERTY IN WHicn BENEFICIAL LIFE INTER-
EST OR POSSIBILITY OF REVERSION Is RESERVED IN SETTLoR-The
Supreme Court of the United States in May v. Heiner' interpreted
the transfer intended provision of Sec. 401 (c) of the Revenue Act
of 1918 to exclude from its scope the imposition of the estate tax
upon an inter vivos gift wherein a life estate was reserved with
final disposition to occur upon the death of the donor. The basis
for this holding was that the gift had been complete when made
and that by the death of the donor, no interest passed from her to
the living. To prevent this method of tax avoidance, Congress on
March 3, 1931, by joint resolution amended the similar provision
of Sec. 302 (c) of the Revenue Act of 1926 to include, as taxable,
1(1930) 281 U. S. 238, 50 S. Ct. 286, 74 L. Ed. 826, 67 k. L. R. 1244 and
note, discussed in (1931) 15 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 252. The law on this
subject prior to this case is thoroughly treated in Rottschaefer, Taxation of
Transfers Intended to Take Effect in Possession or Enjoyment at Grantor's
Death, (1930) 14 MINNESOTA LAW REvIEW 453, 613.
NOTE
gifts wherein the donor retained a life estate. The amendment is
substantially retained in the present act.2 It was early decided that
the 1931 amendment had no retroactive application to tax gifts
effected or trusts created prior to its enactment.,
However, ince the case of Helveneg v. Haliock,' there has
been some doubt as to whether May v. Heier remains as good
law. If it has been overruled, inter vivos gifts made prior to March
3, 1931, in which the donor retained a life interest, are taxable as
transfers intended along with those now being taxed under Sec.
302 (c) of the Revenue Act of 1932 and subsequent re-enactments.5
A second major problem raised by the Hallock Case is whether
any.gift or trust wherein the death of the donor eliminates even
the remotest possibility of a reversion is taxable as part of the
gross estate.
In the Hallock Case, a trust was created by A giving the in-
come thereof to his wife B for life with a provision that if B
should predecease A, the corpus was to revert to A. The court
held that A's death cut off the possibility of reversion making the
gift complete. This operative significance of A's death was held
to bring the gift within the act as a "transfer . intended to take
effect in possession or enjoyment at or after Ils death." In so
finding the court specifically followed Klein v. United States and
rejected and overruled Helvering v. St. Louis Trust Co.T and
Becker v. St. Louis Trust Co." The question remained whether
the holding of -the case was broad enough to include in its scope
2U. S. C., tit. 26, sec. 811, 26 U. S. C. A., sec. 811, 6 F C. A., tit. 26, sec.
811. "The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by
including the value at the time of his death of all property, real or personal,
tangible or intangible, wherever situated, except real property situated outside
of the United States- (c) To the extent of any interest therem of wluch
the decedent has at any time made a transfer, by trust or otherwise, in con-
templation of or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after
his death, or of which he has at any time made a transfer, by trust or other-
wise, under which he has retained for his life or for any period not ascertain-
able without reference to his death or for any period wluch does not in fact
end before his death (1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the
income from, the property, or (2) the right, either alone or in conjunction
with any person, to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the
property or the income therefrom, except in case of a bona fide sale for an
adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth. "3Hassett v. Welch, (1938) 303 U. S. 303, 58 S. Ct. 559, 82 L. Ed. 858,
discussed in (1938) 22 Mnr-asorA LAW REvmw 1066.
4(1940) 309 U. S. 106, 60 S. Ct. 444, 84 L. Ed. 604, 125 A. L. R. 1368,
discussed in (1940) 24 MiNxSEoTA LAW REvmw 882.5See footnote 2.6(1931) 283 U. S. 231, 51 S. Ct. 398, 75 L. Ed. 996.
7(1935) 296 U S. 39, 56 S. Ct. 74, 80 L. Ed. 29, 100 A. L. R. 1239 and note,
discussed in (1936) 20 MuNfasorA LAw Rnzvw 570.8(1935) 296 U. S. 48, 56 S. Ct. 78, 80 L. Ed. 35.
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the situation, as in May v Hemer, where the death of the donor
merely cuts off the life estate he reserved in himself and makes
the gift come into the actual enjoyment of the donee, or the
situation where any interest, no matter how remote, reserved by
the donor, is cut off by his death.
It appears that a strategic battle between the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue and the courts has been waged on the question
of the effect of the Hallock Case on May v. Heiner In Commnis-
swner of Internal Revenue v Hall's Estate," Circuit Judge Frank,
dissenting, says, "In Helvering v. Proctor," the government urged
us to hold that Helvermg v. Hallock had overruled May v Hemr
A majority of our court refused to so hold, I dissented. For un-
explained reasons, the government, having described Proctor to
us as a test case, failed to seek certiorari. Its strategy seems to
have been, instead, to make flank attacks designed to wear down
May v. Henher That strategy seems to have been successful.""
The Supreme Court has not yet had the problem, as such. In
two cases in 1945, the court had before it the situation where the
income was reserved to the grantor for life, however, another
factor was found in each to allow the court to hold the gift taxable
as a transfer intended without specifically overruling May v
Hemner The first of these was Fidelity Co. v Rothensies"2 where
the income for life from a trust was reserved to the settlor and
given to her daughters upon her death. Upon the death of the
daughters, the corpus was to go to their descendants, but if both
daughters died without leaving surviving descendants, the corpus
was to be paid to such persons as the settlor might appoint by will.
The court held that this last "string" held by the settlor made
the entire corpus taxable as a transfer intended. The next case was
Comnmssioner v Estate of Field'$ in which a trust was created
for the joint lives of two nieces and for the life of the survivor
with the income to be paid to the settlor for his life and to named
beneficiaries upon his death. There was a provision to the effect
that if the trust terminated before the settlor's death, the corpus
was to revert to him. It was held that this possibility made the
gift a transfer intended since the settlor's death severed the possi-
bility that the trust property might not go as directed in the trust
9(C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1946) 153 F (2d) 172.1o(C.C.A.,2d Cir. 1944) 140 F (2d) 87, 155 A. L. R. 845 and note.
11153 F (2d) 172, 174.12(1945) 324 U. S. 108, 65 S. Ct. 508, 89 L. Ed. 782, 159 A. L. R. 227
13(1945) 324 U S. 113. 65 S. Ct. 511, 89 L. Ed. 786, 159 A. L. R. 230 and
note.
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instrument. In both of these cases, Mr. Justice Douglas wrote con-
currng opinions pointing out that it was not necessary then to
decide whether May v. Hemer survived the Hallock Case.
When the Circuit Courts of Appeals have had the precise prob-
lem, they have held that May v. Hewer is still good law.' 4 But in
a vigorous dissent in Helvering v. Proctor,"2 Circuit Judge Frank
strenuously argued not only that May v. Hemer was overruled by
the Hallock Case, but also that it was wrongly decided in the first
place.1 6 It would seem that the underlying principle of the Hallock
Case and subsequent Supreme Court cases require the conclusion
that May v. Hemner has been overruled. Since "Testamentary dis-
positions of an inter vivos nature cannot escape the force of this
section by biding behind legal mceties contained in devices and
forms created by conveyancers,"'-, surely the reservation of the
income for life in a gift makes the transfer of the corpus or income
to the donee after the donor's death as much an actual gift at death
as any of those heretofore considered.'
Three Supreme Court cases which have shed further light on the
problem raised by the Hallock Case of the effect of the reservation
of an interest by the grantor are Fidelity Co. v. Rothenstes and
Commissioner v. Estate of Field 2 0 discussed above, and Gold-
stone v. United States.2  In the Goldstone Case concurrent life in-
14Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Kellogg, (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1941)
119 F (2d) 54, United States v. Brown, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1943) 134 F (2d)
372; Helvering v. Proctor, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1944) 140 F (2d) 87, 155 A. L.
R. 845 and note; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Irving Trust Co.,
(C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1945) 147 F (2d) 946; Commssioner of Internal Revenue v.
Hall's Estate, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1946) 153 F (2d) 172. Drummond v. Clauson,(D. Maine 1946) 67 F Supp. 872, is a recent district court decision holding to
the same effect. But cf. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Bank of Call-
foria (C.C.A. 9th- Cir. 1946) 155 F (2d) 1 and Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Bayne's Estate, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1946) 155 F (2d) 475, which on
facts similar to May v. Heiner reach a contrary result on a different theory.
15(C.C-A. 2d Cir. 1944) 140 F. (2d) 87, 89, 155 A. L. R. 845.
'6Circuit Judge Frank argued. "Virtually all commentators agree that
May v. Heiner was wrongly decided because it ignored the plain wording
of Sec. 302 (c). For a remainder following a life estate reserved to the donor
had always, before the enactment of Sec. 302 (c) been regarded as one wluch
takes 'effect in possession or enjoyment at or after lus death.' The words
'possessioni or enjoyment' were words of art with a well settled meaning,
and their use in Sec. 302 (c) clearly showed that Congress meant that the
time of passing or vesting of title should be of no consequence."
"7Goldstone v. United States, (1945) 325 U. S. 687, 691, 65 S. Ct. 1323,
86 L. Ed. 1871, 159 A. L. R. 1330 and note.
'sSee Note, (1945) 40 IIl. L. Rev. 285, 289; Note (1940) Yale L. J.
1118, 1123, Paul, Federal Estate and Gift Taxation (1946 Supp.) Sec. 7.15.
19See footnote 12.2 See footnote 13.
21(1945) 325 U.S. 687,65 S. Ct. 1323,89 L. Ed. 1871, 159 A. L. R. 1330.
cf. United States v. Tonkin, (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1945) 150 F (2d) 531, cert.
denied (1945) 326 U. S. 771, 66 S. Ct. 176, 90 L. Ed. 106.
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surance and annuity contracts were obtained by the insured.12 By
their terms the insured received the annuity income for his life, with
his wife or daughters to receive proceeds from the insurance contract
and the annuity contract upon his death, if they outlived him. While
the insured lived, his wife had the unrestricted right to assign, bor-
row money, receive dividends, change beneficiaries, or even surren-
der the policies and obtain their cash surrender value. Nevertheless,
the provisions that the insured was to get these rights if his wife
predeceased him and that the proceeds were to go to his estate if
he outlived both his wife and daughters were held to make the
arrangement taxable as a transfer intended. The court said, "The
essential element in this case, therefore, is the decedent's posses-
sion of a reversionary interest at the time of his death, delaying
until then the determination of the ultimate possession or enjoy-
ment of the property "
The Circuit Courts have applied the Hallock Case and the
above subsequent cases in varying fact situations. In Mullikin v
Magruder,23 a partnership agreement provided that the decedent
held a life interest in a Y share of the partnership, with remainder
to his son, but that upon termination of the partnership, Y8 of the
assets were to be distributed to the decedent. The court, on the
basis that the death of the decedent cut off this last possibility and
gave complete dominion to the vested remainder in the assets to
the son, included the Y interest in the gross estate as the subject
of a transfer intended. In Eldredge v Rothenstws 24 there was a
trust reserving the income to the settlor for life with the re-
mainder to her children or their issue, and if there be no children
or issue living at the death of the settlor, as the settlor might by
will appoint. The court held that the settlor's death cut off the
"string" of this contingent power of appointment and therefore
the gift was includible as a transfer intended. In Dominick's Es-
tate v Commisswner of Internal Revenue25 the same rule was
applied to a trust whereby the income was to be paid to the son
until he was twenty-five, at which time the corpus was to be
turned over to him, but if the son died before he reached the age
22The court held that these two contracts must be considered together
and contained none of the true elements of insurance risk. Therefore the
section of the act relating to amounts receivable as insurance under policies
taken out by the defendant was inapplicable, and the only question involved
is whether the proceeds of the contract were the subject of a transfer in-
tended.23(C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1945) 149 F (2d) 593.
24(C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1945) 150 F (2d) 23, cert. denied (1945) 326 U. S.
772, 66 S. Ct. 336, 90 L. Ed. 222.
25(C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1946) 152 F (2d) 843.
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of twenty-five, the gift was to go to the settlor if still alive. The
death of the settlor cut off tis last possibility, making the gift
taxable as a transfer intended. In Central Hanover Bank & Trwst
Co. v. Umted States,28 the Court of Claims had under considera-
ton a trust whereby the settlor reserved a life interest with re-
mainder to her three children. At the trial it had been assumed
that the applicable New York law would have effected a reversion
to the settlor if she outlived all of her children, and the gift was
found to be a transfer intended on the basis that she was charge-
able with intending to reserve that possibility.2 7 On motion for a
new trial the estate prevailed on the basis that the New York law
did not create such a reversion, or at least that it was in doubt,
and hence the settlor nught have thought it did not and therefore
she had not intended to retain the possibility of reverter. The
rule was stretched further in Commissoner of Internal Rev. v.
Bank of Califormna s2 where the settlor reserved the income to
herself for life and provided that on her death the corpus was to
be divided between her son and daughter or their issue. There was
also a provision that if either of the beneficiaries predeceased the
settlor without issue, the other beneficiary was to take his share.
The Tax Court held that there was no possibility of the estate
reverting to the settlor by the trust itself, and that such a rever-
sion could only occur upon the settlor's surviving all of her two
children and five grandchildren and then by operation of law, and
that this possibility was not enough to render the corpus subject
to the estate tax as a transfer intended upon the settlor's death.
The Circuit Court reversed, quoting from Fidelity Co. v. Rothen-
.nes2s and Commissonzer v. Estate of Field,18 to hold that this
possibility of reversion created by law was enough to make the
gift a transfer intended and that the cutting off of this possibility,
no matter how remote it was, made the settlor's death the taxable
event to include the entire corpus in her gross estate.3' Relying on
2 8(Ct of Claims 1945) 58 F Supp. 565.
27Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, (Ct. of Claims
1944) 57 F Supp. 497
28(C.C A 9th Cir. 1946) 155 F (2d) 1, cert. denied (1946) 67 S. Ct 73.29See footnote 12.30oSee footnote 13.
-Cf. Gallois v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (C.C.A. 9th Cir.
1945) 152 F (2d) 81, cert. denied (1946) 66 S. Ct. 898, 90 L. Ed. 764.
The same court m this case found a gift taxable as a transfer intended by
virtue of a reversion provision in the trust instrument. The court points out
that the reversion provided by the trust instrument would have existed in
any event because of California law. The language of the case is not clear
as to whether the same result would have been reached without the express
reversion by the settlor.
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these two cases also, the same result was reached in Cominssoner
of Internal Revenue v Bayne/s Estate.3 2 Here the grantor re-
served the income of the trust to himself for life and on his death
to the then surviving children or issue of the grantor and in default
thereof to the surviving brothers and sister of the grantor or Issue.
The court held that the grantor retained an interest which his
death terminated and the trust corpus was therefore includible
in the grantor's estate. The court quoted from the Field Case "It
makes no difference how vested may be the remainder interests
in the corpus or how remote or uncertain may be the decedent's
reversionary interest."
Notwithstanding the extent to which the courts have gone to
impose taxability in these situations, some cases have indicated that
Helvering v Hallock does not require the taxing of all inter vivos
trusts regardless of the circumstances under which the remainders
are to take effect in possession or enjoyment. In Conan isso ner
of Internal Revenue v Kellogg,3 the court considers the argument
that the corpus might revert to the settlor by operation of law if
he should outlive his beneficiaries and rejects it saying that if
such an argument were allowed, every inter vivos trust would be
includible in the grantor's estate. In Lloyd's Estate v Comnums-
sioner of Internal Revenue, 4 the same court applies the Kellogg
Case, indicating that it considers it a logical limitation on the scope
of Sec. 302 (c) Further argument for this view is given in Post v
United States3" where the court had before it a trust instrument
which provided for the termination of the trust on the death of the
survivor of named beneficiaries and the payment of the principal
to lawful issue then living of persons named, or failing such issue,
then to the lawful issue then living of the trustor. The contention
of the Commissioner was that if all the designated persons had pre-
deceased the settlor, the trust corpus would have reverted to the
settlor, and that the settlor's death cut off this interest. Il[owever
the court distinguished Helvering v Hallock and the Fidelity Co.
and Field Cases from the case before it on the basis of no express
reservation of interest by the settlor in the case before it, and in
holding against taxability of the trust corpus said "It was a purely
32(C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1946) 155 F (2d) 475. Cf. Thomas v. Graham, (C.C.A.
5th Cir. 1946) 158 F (2d) 561, Beach v. Busey, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1946) 156
F (2d) 496.
3(C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1941) 119 F (2d) 54.
34(C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1944) 141 F (2d) 758.
35(E.D. N.Y. 1945) 61 F Supp. 380. This case was decided prior to
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Bayne's Estate, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1946)
155 F (2d) 475.
NOTE 285
inter vivos gift. Viewed in the strictest light, it cannot be interpreted
as a devious device to avoid an estate tax by parting with property
during her life."
It would seem that there still is some doubt as to the extent
to which inter vivos trusts with a possibility of reversion created
by operation of law are to be included in the donor's gross estate
for estate tax purposes. Theoretically, there would seem to be little
distinction between such reversion and one expressly made by the
grantor except possibly as such expression would go to the ques-
tion of whether there was a transfer ntended. The exact rule is
yet to be set out by the Supreme Court.
